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Abstract
The probabilistic analysis of atmospheric transport patterns from most important nu-
clear risk sites in the Euro-Arctic region is performed employing the methodology devel-
oped within the “Arctic Risk” Project of the NARP Programme (Baklanov and Mahura,
2003). The risk sites are the nuclear power plants in the Northwest Russia, Finland,5
Sweden, Lithuania, United Kingdom, and Germany as well as the Novaya Zemlya test
site of Russia. The geographical regions of interest are the Northern and Central Eu-
ropean countries and Northwest Russia.
In this study, the employed research tools are the trajectory model to calculate a
multiyear dataset of forward trajectories that originated over the risk site locations, and10
a set of statistical methods (including exploratory, cluster, and probability fields analy-
ses) for analysis of trajectory modelling results. The probabilistic analyses of trajectory
modelling results for eleven sites are presented as a set of various indicators of the risk
sites possible impact on geographical regions and countries of interest.
The nuclear risk site possible impact (on a particular geographical region, territory,15
country, site, etc.) due to atmospheric transport from the site after hypothetical ac-
cidental release of radioactivity can be properly estimated based on a combined in-
terpretation of the indicators (simple characteristics, atmospheric transport pathways,
airflow and fast transport probability fields, maximum reaching distance and maximum
possible impact zone, typical transport time and precipitation factor fields) for different20
time periods (annual, seasonal, and monthly) for any selected site (both separately for
each site or grouped for several sites) in the Euro-Arctic region. Such estimation could
be the useful input information for the decision-making process, risk assessment, and
planning of emergency response systems for sites of nuclear, chemical, and biological
danger.25
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1. Introduction
A number of nuclear risk sites (NRSs) having nuclear reactors, weapons, and radioac-
tive wastes and posing concern for the population are situated in the Northern Eu-
rope territories. Among these is the Northwest Russia, where there are about 180
nuclear reactors in operation, 140 reactors are waiting to be decommissioned, more5
than 10 storage sites for radioactive waste containing large amounts of spent nuclear
fuel (Bergman and Baklanov, 1998). “The State of the Arctic Environment” report of the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP, 1998) had emphasized: “there
are considerable shortcomings in the analysis... that allow conclusions to be drawn
about the probability and consequences of potential accidents in the nuclear power10
plants in the Arctic”. This report gave the following recommendation: “More author-
itative and comprehensive evaluations should be made for the risk posed to human
health and the environment by accidents in nuclear power installations. Assessments
of the risk of releases of radionuclides and the radiological consequences for humans
and the environment should be performed for all existing nuclear installations in, and15
near, the Arctic”.
The main aim of our study is the following. First, it is testing of the methodology for
evaluation of the atmospheric transport of radioactive pollutants from the nuclear risk
sites (NRSs) on different geographical regions, territories, countries, etc. Second, it is
combining of the atmospheric transport modelling and statistical analyses to evaluate20
possible impact due to atmospheric transport from accidental releases at NRSs located
in the Euro-Arctic region. The main purpose of our study is a probabilistic analysis of
atmospheric transport patterns from selected sites for further GIS-based studies of
vulnerability to radioactive deposition and risk assessment of the NRS impact on the
environment and population.25
The risk sites of concern (in total 11) located in the European countries and Russia
(Fig. 1) are the nuclear power plants (NPPs) and former nuclear weapons test site. The
geographical regions and countries of interest are the Northern and Central European
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countries and Northwest Russia. In this study several research tools developed within
the “Arctic Risk” Project (AR-NARP, 2001–2003; Baklanov and Mahura, 2001; Mahura,
2001; Mahura and Baklanov, 2002; Baklanov et al., 2002b) were applied. Baklanov
and Mahura (2003) noted that for assessment of risk and vulnerability it is important to
consider a set of various social-geophysical factors and probability indicators. These5
depend on the geographical location of the area of interest and structure of its popu-
lation. Thus, for estimation of the potential nuclear risk and vulnerability levels for the
nuclear risk sites it will be important to know:
– Which geographical regions are the most likely to be impacted?
– What are the fast, average, typical times and their probabilities for atmospheric10
transport from NRSs to neighbouring countries?
– What are precipitation probability and contribution during atmospheric transport
for various atmospheric layers and over different geographical territories?
– What are temporal (annual, seasonal, and monthly) and spatial variability for the
above mentioned characteristics?15
2. Selected approaches
The suggested methodology by Baklanov and Mahura (2003) mentioned several re-
search tools and approaches, which could be applied for the probabilistic atmospheric
studies. The main focus of this paper will be only on a consideration of the trajectory
modelling approach and statistical analyses of trajectory modelling results in order to20
evaluate the possible impact due to atmospheric transport from the selected NRSs on
the geographical territories within the Euro-Arctic region. The further papers will de-
scribe analysis of the NRS impact indicators based on dispersion modelling approach
as well as the GIS-based risk and vulnerability analysis for the risk sites in the Euro-
Arctic region.25
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2.1. Nuclear risk sites of concern
The selected sites of concern include the nuclear power plants in Russia, Lithuania,
Germany, United Kingdom, Finland, and Sweden (Table 1, Fig. 1). All these sites are
located within the area of the study’s interest. Moreover, the Kola NPP (Murmansk Re-
gion, Russia) has the old type of reactors (VVER-230); Leningrad (Leningrad Region,5
Russia) and Ignalina (Lithuania) NPPs have the RBMK type of reactor (having the most
concern of experts); and the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago of Russia was considered as
a former nuclear weapons test site and potential site for nuclear waste deposit. The
Block of the British NPPs (BBP) is represented by a group of the risk sites: Chapelcross
(Annan, Dumfriesshire), Calder Hall (Seascale, Cumbria), Heysham (Heysham, Lan-10
cashire), and Hunterston (Ayrshire, Strathclyde) NPPs and the Sellafield reprocessing
plant. The Block of the German NPPs (BGP) is represented by a group of NPPs: Stade
(Stade, Niedersachsen), Kruemmel (Geesthacht, Schleswig-Holstein), Brunsbuettel
(Brunsbuettel, Schleswig-Holstein), Brokdorf (Brokdorf, Schleswig-Holstein), and Un-
terweser (Rodenkirchen, Niedersachsen). Although these NPPs use different reactor15
types and, hence, they could have different risks of accidental releases, the grouping is
useful for airborne transport studies because all NPPs are located geographically close
to each other and, hence, atmospheric transport patterns will be relatively similar. It
is important to note that the probability of accidents at NRSs is not considered in our
study, and the focus is only on the geophysical airborne transport aspects.20
2.2. Research tools
The first research tool is the trajectory modelling. In our study, an isentropic trajectory
model based on a technique described by Merrill et al. (1985) was applied. A multiyear
dataset (1991–1996) of 5-day forward trajectories originated over the NRS locations
(shown in Table 1, Fig. 1) at various altitudes above sea level (asl) was calculated.25
For the trajectory calculation, the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP)
Global Tropospheric Analyses was used. For each site, trajectories were calculated
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twice per day at 00:00 and 12:00 UTC at 16 isentropic surfaces (i.e. more than 280
thousand trajectories). Then, from calculated trajectories only about of 17.5 thousand
of whose originated near the surface were selected for further statistical analysis.
The second research tool is the cluster analysis. This approach should be con-
sidered as the simple approach. The cluster analysis was applied in several studies5
related to NRSs located in the Chukotka Region (Mahura et al., 1999), Kola Peninsula
(Baklanov et al., 2002a), and Russian Far East (Mahura et al., 2002). The potential risk
sources considered there were the nuclear power plants, spent nuclear fuel storage fa-
cilities, and nuclear submarine bases. In general, this technique allows identifying
atmospheric transport pathways from the sites.10
The third research tool is the probability fields analysis. The attempt to use this
analysis to interpret atmospheric transport patterns from the nuclear risk sites was
performed by Mahura et al. (2001) and Baklanov et al. (2002a), on example of the Kola
NPP (Murmansk region, Russia). The major focus was the annual airflow probability
fields which allowed testing the quality of the cluster analysis of trajectories used for15
identification of atmospheric transport pathways from the sites. Such probability fields
analysis provides additional information and detailed structure of the airflow patterns
from the site on a geographical map. In our study, the annual, seasonal, and monthly
probability fields for the airflow, fast transport, and other indicators were constructed
and evaluated for the selected NRSs.20
2.3. Indicators of risk site possible impact due to atmospheric transport
The results of probabilistic analysis for the nuclear risk sites are presented in a form
of various indicators (Fig. 2) of the NRS possible impact on geographical regions, ter-
ritories, and countries of concern. These indicators are based on evaluation of the
trajectory modelling results. Among these indicators, the following should be men-25
tioned: 1) simple characteristics of the NRS possible impact, 2) atmospheric transport
pathways (ATP), 3) airflow (AF) probability fields, 4) fast transport (FT) probability fields,
5) maximum possible impact zone (MPIZ), 6) maximum reaching distance (MRD), 7)
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precipitation factor (PF), and 8) typical transport time (TTT) fields.
3. Results and discussion
In this section of the paper the combined analyses and interpretation of various indica-
tors of the NRS possible impact will be given on examples of eleven NRSs located in
the Euro-Arctic region. More details (including annual, seasonal, and monthly variabil-5
ity of indicators) can be found in Mahura and Baklanov (2002).
3.1. Simple characteristics of the nuclear risk site impact and atmospheric transport
pathways
In this study, all calculated forward trajectories that originated over the NRS locations
were analyzed in order to investigate the likelihood that the risk sites might have impact10
on the neighbouring countries or distant geographical regions. As a first approximation,
trajectories can be separated into groups by altitudes of initial trajectory points. The
boundaries of geographical regions can be selected depending on political borders,
climatic regimes, areas of research interest, etc. For simplicity, it can be assumed
that any trajectory, which crosses the boundaries of the chosen geographical region,15
might bring air parcels containing radionuclides. Therefore, only trajectories crossing
boundaries of these regions should be selected in further evaluation of the NRS impact.
Among the simple characteristics the following could be suggested. First, it is the
number and percentage of trajectories reaching the boundaries of the chosen geo-
graphical regions (upper boundary of the NRS impact). Second, it is the number and20
percentage of days when, at least, one trajectory had reached the region (lower bound-
ary of the NRS impact). Third, it is the average transport time of air parcels to reach
the chosen regions. Fourth, it is the probability of atmospheric transport within different
atmospheric layers (boundary layer and free troposphere). Fifth, it is the likelihood of
very rapid (or fast) atmospheric transport of air parcels, i.e. transport in one day or25
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less. All these characteristics can be evaluated over a multiyear dataset of calculated
trajectories, by individual year, season, and month. Such analyses allow investigating
possible spatial and temporal variation in the airflow patterns from the NRS region to
the chosen geographical regions of concern. Another approach in the simple analysis
is to apply, as a research tool, a cluster analysis technique for trajectories originated at5
each site. As a result, the mean trajectories for each cluster will be produced. These
mean trajectories are atmospheric transport pathways from the sites, and they can be
explained based on existing synoptic features and peculiarities in the studied regions.
These pathways show the general direction and probability of atmospheric transport
from the site region.10
Although results of the cluster analysis are useful, they are not completely repre-
sentative, because information between clusters represented by mean trajectories (or
transport pathways), reflecting only the general direction of airflow from the site, is
“missing”. Therefore, another research tool – probability fields analysis – is required to
extract this additional information.15
It should be noted that evaluation of simple characteristics and atmospheric trans-
port pathways for several NRSs in the Russian Far East and Northwest Russia are
discussed by Mahura et al. (1999); Mahura (2001); Baklanov et al. (2002a); Mahura
(2002).
3.2. Airflow and fast transport probability fields20
3.2.1. Airflow probability fields
The first type of probabilistic fields – airflow probability fields (constructed based on
5-day isentropic trajectories) – shows the common features in the atmospheric trans-
port patterns from NRSs. First, it could provide a general insight on the possible main
direction of atmospheric transport for radioactive plume. Second, it shows a proba-25
bility that radioactive plume will reach or pass over a given area on a geographical
map. In comparison with the atmospheric transport pathways, the AF probability fields
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show more detailed information about distribution of direction and probabilities of at-
mospheric transport from the sites toward a particular geographical territory, region,
country, etc. in the studied area. These fields characterize not only the highly possible
direction of the contaminated cloud atmospheric transport from the risk sites, but also
define boundaries of territories on a geographical map where the order of magnitude5
of the NRS possible impact could be evaluated. In this case, it is possible to depict
the region (i.e. Area of the Highest Probability of the Possible Impact – AHPPI; see
Baklanov and Mahura, 2003) on a map where the risk site impact might be the highest,
and for other regions to re-calculate the NRS possible impact as a part of NRS AHPPI.
Moreover, the airflow probability field is a reliable test to reject or support results of10
the cluster analysis (which can be applied to identify the general atmospheric transport
pathways from NRSs), because the calculated clusters (or mean trajectories) will be
located in the troughs and crests of probabilistic fields.
The regions, where the highest crossing by trajectories is occurred, have the highest
probability of the NRS possible impact. In this study, all airflow probability fields were15
constructed by averaging airflow patterns over a selected time period: year, season,
and month (based on a multiyear dataset). The seasonal division was considered
as standard (i.e. each season included three months; for example, spring includes
March, April, and May). Although it should be noted that for a particular application the
different scale might be considered: by the vegetation period, by snow cover presence,20
by prevailing wind direction, etc.
3.2.2. Temporal variability of the airflow probability fields
On an annual scale, the westerly transport dominates for all NRSs considered in this
study (Fig. 3). Some additional transport patterns are seen. For the block of the British
NPP (BBP) Oskarshamn NPP (ONP) and Olkiluoto NPP (TRS), the airflow pattern is25
shifted toward the northeast of the sites. For the Ignalina NPP (INP), the AF proba-
bility field is shifted toward the southeast of the site. For NRSs located closer to the
North Atlantic region (i.e. blocks of the British (BBP) and German (BGP) NPPs, and
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Barsebaeck NPP (BBP)), the boundaries of probabilistic fields are extended farther
(approximately on 1/3 in comparison with other NRSs) in the western direction from
the sites. Therefore, the probability to reach more remote (in the western direction)
territories from the sites is increased.
As any meteorological variable, the calculated AF probability fields based on the wind5
characteristics have a temporal variability. Let us consider, as examples, the variability
of the airflow patterns for the Kola NPP by seasons (Fig. 4) and Leningrad NPP by
months (Fig. 5).
For the Kola NPP (Fig. 4), during all seasons, the predominant transport is in the
eastern direction from the site. Although, during spring, there is increase of transport10
in the south-western direction (it is reflected by shifting of the AHHPI boundaries to the
central territories of Finland). During summer, these boundaries are extended to the
south of the site (reaching 65◦N), but in other seasons they are located northerly of
this latitude. During winter, the probability to reach Sweden is minimal; but the north-
western and central regions of Russia are at the higher risk of being impacted during15
atmospheric transport from the site. Moreover, it should be noted, that isolines of the
airflow probability fields could be represented as the varying boundaries showing an
order of the NRS possible impact on a particular geographical territory. For example, for
the Yamal Peninsula (Russia), likelihood of the KNP possible impact is the lowest during
summer compared with other seasons, whereas for the Baltic States this likelihood is20
the lowest during spring.
For the Leningrad NPP (LNP), more detailed consideration of temporal variability
by months (Fig. 5) showed some peculiarities in the airflow patterns, which are not
seen on both annual and seasonal scales. In July, atmospheric transport in the south-
ern direction dominates for trajectories originated within the boundary layer over the25
LNP region. The LNP AHPPI boundaries reach territories southerly of 55◦N. During
February–March, the boundaries are extended significantly to the west of the site. Dur-
ing October–November, the probability for air parcels to pass over the Barents Sea is
decreased. In September, there is a probability to reach the western seashore of the
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Southern Norway, although during other months, only a small part of the northern ter-
ritories of this country could be affected due to atmospheric transport from the LNP
region. Throughout the year, the boundaries of LNP AHPPI are located within the Rus-
sian territories, except in March, September, and November when these are extended
also to the northern territories of Estonia.5
3.2.3. Fast transport probability fields
The second type of probabilistic fields – fast transport probability fields (constructed
based on 0.5 and 1-day isentropic trajectories) – indicates the probability of the air
parcels movement during the first day of transport. It is important information, espe-
cially, for the impact estimating of the short-lived radionuclides such as 133,131I, 132Te10
and Noble gases such as 85Kr, 131,133,135Xe. These fast transport fields show those
territories that can be reached during the first day of atmospheric transport from the
site, and those areas that are at the most danger due to atmospheric transport. In
this study, the fast transport probability fields were calculated after 12 and 24 h of at-
mospheric transport from the risk sites. Similarly to the AF probability fields, the FT15
probability fields could be used for evaluation of the risk site impact during the first day
after accidental release at site.
Let us consider several examples of result interpretation. First, it is an individual
interpretation of the fast transport probability fields for one or more NRSs with respect
to geographical regions, territories, and countries of concern. Second, it is a combined20
interpretation of the airflow and fast transport probability fields for two or more NRSs
with respect to each other and geographical regions, territories, or countries of concern.
3.2.4. Individual interpretation of the fast transport probability fields for one or more
sites
Let us consider some NRSs for such an analysis. For the Kola NPP (KNP), the annual25
FT probability field after the first 12 h of atmospheric transport (Fig. 6a) showed that the
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entire Kola Peninsula is located within the boundaries of KNP AHPPI. During the first
12 h, the atmospheric transport from KNP is dominated by westerlies, although after
24 h the transport to southwest can be also identified (Fig. 6b). Two maxima of AHPPI
could be seen. The first maximum is located in the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula,
the second – in the central regions of Karelia and Finland. Both maxima show that5
after a day of transport, there is the highest possibility that the contaminated cloud
could arrive to the mentioned territories, and hence, the NRS possible impact might be
higher compared with other territories. On a seasonal scale, for the Kola NPP, during
fall the FT probability field after 24 h showed a shift of AHPPI in the eastern direction
from the site toward less populated territories of the Northwest Russia. During summer,10
the total area of the FT probability fields is smaller (due to significant decrease of wind
speeds) compared with other seasons. This tendency is observed for all NRSs. In the
same time, more southern regions with respect to the KNP location are included in the
boundaries of AHPPI. There are also several maxima of AHPPI throughout the year,
except summer.15
On an annual scale, for the Novaya Zemlya test site (NZS) there is a pattern showing
transport in the western direction from the site after the first 12 h of atmospheric trans-
port (Fig. 6c), and a pattern showing transport in the southern direction from the site
after the first 24 h of atmospheric transport. It should be noted that for the FT probabil-
ity field after 12 h, the AHPPI, although it is located near the site, is separated into two20
maxima located over the Arctic seas: one to the east and one to the west of the site.
After the first day, the NZS possible impact could be the highest on the territories of
the Russian Arctic seashore (Fig. 6d), and there are also two maxima of NZS AHPPI
located to the south of the site.
Let us compare the NRS possible impact from two or more NRSs on a particular25
country and region of concern – e.g. 1) Denmark and 2) Kaliningrad Region (Russia).
For this purpose, for simplicity, the annual (although seasonal or monthly variability
could be used) fast transport probability fields after 12 and 24 h of atmospheric trans-
port were evaluate for 1) the blocks of the British (BBP) and German (BGP) NPPs (as
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example 1; see Fig. 7); 2) the Ignalina (INP) and Barsebaeck (BNP) NPPs (as example
2; see Fig. 8). Such an analysis could allow determining: which of NRSs will represent
the highest danger due to atmospheric transport, from the probabilistic point of view, to
a considered geographical region, territory, country, etc.
In the first example, for both blocks of NPPs – German and British, during the first5
12h, the tendency dominating of westerly flows is observed (Figs. 7a, c). The area of
BGP AHPPI is larger compared with the area of BBP AHPPI. The boundaries of the
BGP AHPPI’s middle and high values (>50%) reach the central and southern territo-
ries of Denmark. For BBP, the maximal values of AHPPI are located in vicinity of the
British Islands, and probability to reach the Danish territories is minimal. The FT prob-10
ability fields after 24 h (Figs. 7b, d) showed that although the dominating atmospheric
transport for both sites is still toward the east, for BBP the transport in the southern and
northern directions is observed. The BBP AHPPI area is significantly increased, and
its boundaries are extended farther in the meridional direction compared with latitudinal
direction. Hence, the probability to reach the western territories of Denmark has risen.15
In the second example, for two NRSs – Ignalina and Barsebaeck NPPs – the west-
erly flows dominate during the first 12 h of atmospheric transport (Figs. 8a, c). For INP,
the end of the first day shows a tendency of the airflow shifting in the south-eastern
direction from the site. For BNP, the western territories of the Kaliningrad Region will
be located within the AHPPI boundaries of this site. Moreover, the entire Kaliningrad20
Region, Lithuania, and Latvia lie inside the BNP AHPPI after 24 h of atmospheric trans-
port (Figs. 8b, d). Although, for INP, the medium values of INP AHPPI are observed
only on the eastern territories of the Kaliningrad Region.
3.2.5. Combined interpretation of airflow and fast transport probability fields for sev-
eral sites25
In this section, the combined analysis of the AF and both FT (12 and 24 h) probability
fields for several NRSs is considered. The seasonal variability of the airflow and fast
transport patterns is compared (Fig. 9) for the blocks of the British (BBP) and German
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(BGP) NPPs, Loviisa (LRS) and Barsebaeck (BNP) NPPs with respect to the Nordic
countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Faeroe Islands. It is
a convenient step for such analysis to plot a selected field on one figure for several
NRSs simultaneously, and to choose several critical isolines (for example, 10, 25, 50,
75, >90% of NRS AHPPI) for better and easier interpretation of results.5
The seasonal variability of the airflow patterns for two NRSs – BBP and BGP – is
shown in Fig. 9a, and it reflects the dominance of the westerly flows in the atmospheric
transport from these sites. The AHPPI boundaries (>90) for both sites intersect each
other over the North Sea throughout the year, except summer. The total area of the
BBP airflow pattern is larger compared with BGP, and moreover, in spring it almost10
covers the BGP airflow pattern area. During spring and fall, the BGP AF probability field
is more extended in the western direction from the site toward the North Atlantic Ocean.
Throughout the year, except winter, the Faeroe Islands will be located within 25–50%
of BBP AHPPI. Considering a minimal isoline of 25% of AHPPI, it should be noted that
the central parts of the Scandinavian Peninsula are less reachable throughout the year,15
except spring, and hence, the NRS possible impact is lower compared with Denmark.
For the Faeroe Islands, the BBP possible impact will vary between 25–55% of AHPPI,
although for Iceland it is lower than 25% of AHPPI.
The seasonal variability of the fast transport patterns (for 24 h of atmospheric trans-
port) for two NRSs BBP and LRS is shown in Fig. 9b. For BBP, during spring and20
fall the AHPPI boundaries extended significantly to the south of the site, and moreover,
in spring three maxima of BBP AHPPI could be identified over the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Ireland. During winter and spring, the boundaries of this FT probability
field (enclosed by 25% of AHPPI isoline), are extended farther to north and south com-
pared with other seasons. Among the Scandinavian countries only Denmark and the25
southern territories of Norway and Sweden might be affected by the end of the first day
if an accidental release of radioactivity occurred at the site.
For LRS, in summer, the AHPPI boundaries are more extended to the southeast of
the site, in winter – to the northeast of the site. Throughout the year, the total area
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of the LRS FT probability field is smaller compared with BBP, which could be also
affected by the difference in the continental vs. maritime climatic regimes of the sites,
respectively. The probability of reaching the eastern seashore of Sweden is low, and
the NRS possible impact there will be only 25% of AHPPI. The southern territories
of Finland are always inside the LRS AHPPI boundaries throughout the year, except5
summer.
The seasonal variability of the FT patterns (for 12 h of atmospheric transport) for
three NRSs – BBP, LRS, and BNP – is shown in Fig. 9c. For these sites, the domi-
nating transport pattern is transport in the eastern direction from the sites. The AHPPI
boundaries are extended to the east of the sites, although for BBP it is extended more10
to the north of BBP in summer and to the west of BBP in spring, as well as for BNP
it is extended to the west of BNP during fall. The seasonal variability for LRS is less
pronounced, and throughout the year, the LRS AHPPI boundaries are located within
the same geographical regions. Only neighbouring to NRSs countries and regions will
be located within the AHPPI boundaries. For LRS, it is the border regions of the North-15
west Russia, Finland, and Estonia. For BNP, it is the Baltic seashore of Germany and
Poland, Denmark, and the south of Sweden. For BBP, it is only the United Kingdom
with the western parts of the North Sea.
If consider Denmark as a country of concern than, throughout the year, after the first
12 h of atmospheric transport: 1) Loviisa NPP does not affect the Danish territory 2)20
Barsebaeck NPP will always represent the highest probability of atmospheric transport
to Denmark, and this probability is higher during spring and fall (when the BNP AHPPI
boundaries pass over the Danish borders) compared with other seasons, and 3) block
of the British NPPs shows the relatively fast transport toward Denmark, and the NRS
possible impact over Denmark will be 10-25% of BBP AHPPI.25
Finally, the NRS possible impact (on a particular geographical region, territory, coun-
try, etc.) due to atmospheric transport based on selected probabilistic fields (airflow
and fast transport) for different time periods (annual, seasonal, and monthly) for any of
11 selected NRSs in the Euro-Arctic region both separately for each site or combined
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for several sites can be evaluated.
Moreover, it should be noted that both types of probability fields could be used for
emergency planning and preparedness, in advance, for estimates of possible atmo-
spheric transport (including probabilities, direction, speed, etc.) of the radionuclide
plume after hypothetical accidental releases at NRSs.5
3.3. Maximum possible impact zone and maximum reaching distance indicators
In this section, two additional indicators – maximum reaching distance (MRD) and max-
imum possible impact zone (MPIZ), which could play a role of indicators of the NRS
possible impact, are introduced and analyzed. In addition to the airflow and fast trans-
port probability fields, these are the third type of probabilistic fields. It should be noted10
that this type of the field, first, indicates boundaries of regions with the highest proba-
bility of being reached by trajectories during the first day of atmospheric transport from
the risk sites (i.e. MPIZ indicator). Second, this type of the field shows the farthest
boundaries on the geographical map that might be reached during the first day by, at
least, one trajectory originating over the NRS location (i.e. MRD indicator).15
3.3.1. Maximum possible impact zone
Maximum possible impact zone (MPIZ) indicator, similarly to the FT probability fields, is
important characteristic during the first day of atmospheric transport after an accidental
release at the site. The boundaries of the MPIZ indicators calculated for selected
NRSs in the Euro-Arctic region are shown in Fig. 10. It should be noted, that although20
MPIZs are concentrated in vicinity of the sites, the configuration of the MPIZ isolines
will depend on the dominating transport patterns during the first day of atmospheric
transport, and isolines are extended along the direction of the main flow. For most of the
considered NRSs, the dominating airflows from the sites are westerlies. Additionally,
for the BBP site the MPIZ boundaries are extended to the north of the site. For the25
NZS, KNP, LNP, and INP sites these boundaries are extended to the south of the sites.
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For studies of the long-term consequences of routine discharges or accidental re-
leases at NRSs it is important to evaluate not only boundaries of MPIZ, but also areas
of regions enclosed by the MPIZ isolines. To estimate areas, at first, the figure inside
the MPIZ boundary (or isoline) was approximated by a set of triangles, where each
triangle has a top at the NRS coordinates and a side on the MPIZ isoline. Then, the5
areas of all triangles were calculated, and the total area under the MPIZ isoline was
calculated as a sum of areas of all triangles. The estimation of seasonal maximum and
minimum, and annual average areas for MPIZ is given in Table 2. It should be noted
that this variability depends on the wind velocities on the synoptic- and mesoscales
throughout the year. And although, during winter the wind speeds are higher compared10
with summer, there is a variability defined by the local peculiarities near the sites.
On a seasonal scale (Table 2), among 11 NRSs the MPIZ area reaches a minimum in
summer, except for the Leningrad (LNP), Ignalina (INP), and Barsebaeck (BNP) NPPs,
where a minimum is in fall; and Olkiluoto NPP (TRS), where a minimum is in spring.
For the NZS site, throughout the year, the MPIZ area is maximal among 11 considered15
NRSs.
3.3.2. Maximum reaching distance
Maximum reaching distance (MRD) indicator, similarly to the maximum possible impact
zone indicator, is important characteristic during the first day of atmospheric transport
after an accidental release at the site. The boundaries of the MRD indicators for the20
selected NRSs in the Euro-Arctic region are shown in Fig. 11. If to consider a large
dataset of trajectories, there is a situation after accidental release when the contam-
inated air parcels might reach the most remote geographical regions. The distance
to these remote boundaries might vary between hundreds and thousands kilometers.
Boundaries, depicted on Fig. 11 reflect such possibility. They could be interpreted as25
probable boundaries of the NRS possible impact during the first day after the hypothet-
ical accidental release when atmospheric transport from the site was the fastest. This
indicator helps for decision-makers to evaluate what time (in a worst-case scenario)
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will be available before taking possible countermeasures.
For example, as shown in Fig. 11a, for the Kola NPP (KNP), the zone of such impact
is extended to the northern territories of Sweden and Norway, most of the territory
of Finland, and north-western territories of Russia (including the Barents, White, and
Kara Seas). For the Leningrad NPP (LNP), the boundaries include a significant part of5
Finland, Baltic States Byelorussia, north-western and central regions of Russia. For the
Novaya Zemlya test site (NZS), the atmospheric transport is extended in the latitudinal
direction by 20–30◦ from the site, and in the meridional direction – 8–10◦ from the site.
For the Olkiluoto NPP (TRS), as shown in Fig. 11b, the MRD boundaries are extended
over the large part of the Scandinavian Peninsula, Northwest Russia, Baltic States,10
and, partially over Belarus and Poland.
Similarly to MPIZ, it is possible to estimate areas enclosed by the MRD isolines for
each NRS (see Table 3). The MRD areas, of course, are significantly larger than the
MPIZ areas, and the latter is also included in the MRD area. The dominating direction
of atmospheric transport is less underlined by MRD compared with MPIZ. Because the15
construction of the MRD indicator boundaries includes cells of gridded domain with the
lowest probabilities of transport through the cells (i.e. at least one trajectory reached
a cell), it is not possible to explain such variability only by the general synoptic and
mesoscale features (i.e. there is a contribution of anomalies in the general transport
patterns from the sites throughout the year). Among 11 NRSs, for NZS, the annual20
MRD area is the highest and it is equal to 903.5 ·104 km2 with a maximum in winter and
a minimum in simmer. For the Oskarshamn NPP (ONP), this area is the lowest and
it is equal to 595.1 · 104 km2 with a maximum in winter and a minimum in spring. For
all NRSs, the maximum of MRD area is observed in winter, except for KNP and BGP
(when it is observed in spring).25
3.4. Typical transport time fields
In the emergency response systems for nuclear accidents, the estimation of the ra-
dionuclide transport time to a particular territory, region, country, etc. is one of im-
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portant input parameters in the decision-making process. This information could be
extracted from calculated trajectories by constructing the fourth type of probabilistic
fields called the typical transport time (TTT) fields. These fields show: first, how long it
will take for an air parcel to reach a particular geographical region from the NRS loca-
tion, and second, what territories would be at the highest risk during the first few days5
of the contaminated cloud transport after an accident at NRS.
Several examples of the annual typical transport time fields for evaluation of the NRS
possible impact are shown in Fig. 12. For BBP, during the first day the typical situa-
tion would be atmospheric transport over the United Kingdom territories and adjacent
seas without reaching the populated territories of the continental European countries10
(Fig. 12a). After 2 days, the air mass might reach the southern territories of Norway and
Sweden, as well as countries on the seashore of the North and Baltic Seas. The at-
mospheric transport in the southern and south-eastern directions is minimal. For KNP,
during the first day the territories of the Murmansk and Archangelsk Regions, north of
Karelia, and Finland could be reached, and on the second day, the large territory of15
the Northwest Russia, northern and central regions of the Scandinavian Peninsula are
included (Fig. 12b). Moreover, a significant shift of the TTT isoline at 2 days is seen in
the eastern direction (dominating airflow pattern for the KNP site).
If to assume, that the nuclear weapons testing (considering possible vent emissions
during underground testing as a possible source of radioactivity) would be resumed20
on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago than the typical transport time field shows that, on
average, during the first day the contaminated air parcels could reach only the Russian
Arctic seashore (Fig. 12c). During two days of transport the boundaries are extended
significantly in both eastern and southern directions reaching 60◦N, although countries
of the Northern Europe will remain unaffected.25
Detailed analysis of the TTT fields for individual and several combined NRSs allows
identifying geographical regions and territories of the neighbouring countries which
could be reached during atmospheric transport and might be impacted by radioac-
tive pollution during a selected period of time, if an accidental release (or releases)
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occurred at NRSs. This information could be used to forecast the arrival of the contam-
inated cloud to a particular territory, and hence, it will allow planning countermeasures,
including informing and evacuating of population. The overlapping of isolines (shown
in Fig. 12) occurred because daily the airflow propagates in the direction of prevailing
atmospheric transport, and hence, the TTT isolines will be shifted in the same direction.5
4. Conclusions
In this study the methodology (Baklanov and Mahura, 2003) for evaluation of the at-
mospheric transport of radioactive pollutants from the nuclear risk sites (NRSs) to dif-
ferent geographical regions and countries of concern was tested. The combination of
atmospheric transport modelling and statistical analyses was used to evaluate possible10
impact due to atmospheric transport from the hypothetical accidental release at NRSs
located in the Euro-Arctic region.
The nuclear risk sites of concern (in total 11), selected in this study, are nuclear
power plants (NPPs) located in Russia (Kola and Leningrad NPPs), Finland (Lovi-
isa and Olkiluoto NPPs), Sweden (Barsebaeck, Oskarshamn, and Ringhals NPPs),15
Lithuania (Ignalina NPP), groups of the British and German NPPs as well as the No-
vaya Zemlya test site of Russia. The geographical regions and countries of interest are
the Northern and Central European countries and Northwest Russia.
Once the nuclear risk sites of concern and geographical region of interest were de-
fined, it was of particular interest to answer the following questions: Which geograph-20
ical territories are at highest risk from the hypothetical accidental releases at selected
NRSs? What are probabilities and times for radionuclide atmospheric transport to dif-
ferent neighbouring countries in case of accidents at these NRSs?
To answer these questions, several research tools developed within the Arctic Risk
Project (AR-NARP, 2001–2003) were applied. First, an isentropic trajectory model was25
used to calculate a multiyear (1991–1996) dataset of 5-day forward trajectories that
originated over the NRS locations at various altitudes. As input data for modelling
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purposes we used NCAR meteorological gridded fields. Second, a set of statistical
methods (including exploratory, cluster, and probability fields analyses) was used for
evaluation of trajectory modelling results.
The results of probabilistic analysis of trajectory modelling results for 11 NRSs are
presented as a set of various indicators of the NRS possible impact on geographical5
regions and countries of interest. In this study, we calculated, constructed, and evalu-
ated several important indicators based on trajectory modelling results: 1) atmospheric
transport pathways (ATP), 2) airflow (AF) probability fields, 3) fast transport (FT) prob-
ability fields, 4) maximum reaching distance (MRD), 5) maximum possible impact zone
(MPIZ), and 6) typical transport time (TTT) fields. To evaluate the temporal variability10
of all these indicators, analyses were performed annually, seasonally, and monthly.
In this study, for all selected NRSs, throughout the year, the westerly atmospheric
transport dominates within the boundary layer. For the block of the British, Oskar-
shamn, and Olkiluoto NPPs, the airflow pattern is shifted toward the northeast of the
sites. For the Ignalina NPP, the AF probability field is shifted toward the southeast of15
the site. For NRSs located closer to the North Atlantic region (i.e. blocks of the British
and German NPPs, and Barsebaeck NPP), the boundaries of probabilistic fields are
extended farther (approximately on 1/3 in comparison with other NRSs) in the western
direction from the sites.
Considering Denmark as a country of concern it should be noted that throughout20
the year after the first 12 h of atmospheric transport: 1) Barsebaeck NPP will always
represent the highest probability of atmospheric transport toward Denmark, especially
in spring and fall, 2) block of the German NPPs shows the possible impact of 60–80%
of AHPPI as well as the block of the British NPPs shows the possible impact of 10–25%
of AHPPI over the Danish territory.25
The NRS possible impact (on a particular geographical region, territory, country,
site, etc.) due to atmospheric transport from NRS after hypothetical accidental re-
leases of radioactivity can be properly estimated based on a combined interpretation
of the indicators (simple characteristics, atmospheric transport pathways, airflow and
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fast transport probability fields, maximum reaching distance and maximum possible
impact zone, typical transport time, and precipitation factor fields) for different time
periods (annual, seasonal, and monthly) for any selected NRSs (both separately for
each site or grouped for several sites) in the Euro-Arctic region. Such estimation could
be the useful input information for the decision-making process, risk assessment, and5
planning of emergency response systems at risk sites of nuclear, chemical, biological,
etc. danger.
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Table 1. Nuclear risk sites selected for the study
# Site Lat, ◦ N Lon, ◦ E Site names Country
1 KNP 67.75 32.75 Kola NPP Russia
2 LNP 59.90 29.00 Leningrad NPP Russia
3 NZS 72.50 54.50 Novaya Zemlya Test Site Russia
4 INP 55.50 26.00 Ignalina NPP Lithuania
5 BBP 54.50 −3.50◦ W Block of the British NPPs UK
6 BGP 53.50 9.00 Block of the German NPPs Germany
7 LRS 60.50 26.50 Loviisa NPP Finland
8 TRS 61.50 21.50 Olkiluoto (TVO) NPP Finland
9 ONP 57.25 16.50 Oskarshamn NPP Sweden
10 RNP 57.75 12.00 Ringhals NPP Sweden
11 BNP 55.75 13.00 Barsebaeck NPP Sweden
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Table 2. Seasonal variability of the maximum possible impact zone indicator
Nuclear risk sites NRS Area of MPIZ ·104 km2
Maximum Minimum Annual average
Novaya Zemlya Test Site NZS 79.7 (Win) 47.1 (Sum) 57.4
Kola NPP KNP 41.9 (Spr) 33.6 (Sum) 42.8
Leningrad NPP LNP 57.4 (Win) 34.4 (Fal) 40.2
Ignalina NPP INP 56.9 (Win) 32.1 (Fal) 42.0
Oskarshamn NPP ONP 62.3 (Win) 37.7 (Sum) 41.8
Ringhals NPP RNP 46.0 (Spr) 27.9 (Sum) 38.3
Barsebaeck NPP BNP 44.9 (Win) 35.8 (Fal) 40.2
Loviisa NPP LRS 43.8 (Fal) 31.4 (Sum) 40.9
Olkiluoto (TVO) NPP TRS 48.1 (Fal) 33.9 (Spr) 44.6
Block of the British NPPs BBP 66.8 (Spr) 32.1 (Sum) 43.7
Block of the German NPPs BGP 45.6 (Win) 30.3 (Sum) 42.1
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Table 3. Seasonal variability of the maximum reaching distance indicator
Nuclear risk sites NRS Area of MRD ·104 km2
Maximum Minimum Annual average
Novaya Zemlya Test Site NZS 1200.0 (Win) 361.4 (Sum) 903.5
Kola NPP KNP 975.2 (Spr) 427.1 (Win) 596.0
Leningrad NPP LNP 785.5 (Win) 330.9 (Fal) 691.6
Ignalina NPP INP 842.7 (Win) 540.0 (Sum) 703.0
Oskarshamn NPP ONP 1007.4 (Win) 457.1 (Spr) 595.1
Ringhals NPP RNP 1307.2 (Win) 618.1 (Fal) 854.5
Barsebaeck NPP BNP 1296.3 (Win) 547.9 (Fal) 815.6
Loviisa NPP LRS 1039.3 (Win) 475.9 (Sum) 810.3
Olkiluoto (TVO) NPP TRS 1160.4 (Win) 647.9 (Sum) 780.9
Block of the British NPPs BBP 1100.0 (Win) 385.9 (Spr) 817.0
Block of the German NPPs BGP 962.4 (Spr) 568.6 (Sum) 735.6
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Fig. 1. Nuclear risk sites selected for the study.
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Figure 2.  Characteristics and indicators of the risk site possible impact due to atmospheric 
transport. 
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Fig. 2. Characteristics and indicators of the risk site possible impact due to at ospheric trans-
port.
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Fig. 3. Annual airflow probability fields for selected NRSs in the Euro-Arctic region.
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Fig. 4. Seasonal airflow probability fields for the Kola NPP (KNP).
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Fig. 5. Monthly airflow probability fields for the Leningrad NPP (LNP).
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Fig. 6. Annual fast transport probability fields after 12 and 24 h of atmospheric transport from
the Kola NPP (KNP) and Novaya Zemlya test site (NZS).
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Fig. 7. Annual fast transport probability fields after 12 and 24 h of atmospheric transport from
the blocks of the British NPPs (BBP) and German NPPs (BGP).
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Fig. 8. Annual fast transport probability fields after 12 and 24 h of atmospheric transport from
the Ignalina NPP (INP) and Barsebaeck NPP (BNP).
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Fig. 9. Seasonal variability of the: (a) airflow probability fields for the blocks of the British
(BBP) and German (BGP) NPPs; (b) fast transport probability fields after 24 h of atmospheric
transport from the block of the British (BBP) and Loviisa (LRS) NPPs, and (c) fast transport
probability fields after 12 h of atmospheric transport from the block of the British (BBP), Loviisa
(LRS), and Barsebaeck (BNP) NPPs.
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Fig. 10. Annual boundaries of the maximum possible impact zone indicators (–HI SiteName–)
after 24 h of atmospheric transport for selected NRSs in the Euro-Arctic region.
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Fig. 11. Annual boundaries of the maximum reaching distance indicators after 24 h of ) atmo-
spheric transport for the (a) Block of the British NPPs (MD BBP), Oskarshamn NPP (MD ONP),
Ignalina NPP (MD INP), and Kola NPP (MD KNP), (b) Block of the German NPPs (MD BGP),
Loviisa NPP (MD LRS), Novaya Zemlya Test Site (MD NZS), and Leningrad NPP (MD LNP);
and (c) Barsebaeck NPP (MD BNP), Ringhals NPP (MD RNP), and Olkiluoto NPP (MD TRS).
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Fig. 12. Annual typical transport time (TTT) fields at 1 (1d) and 2 (–2d–) days of atmospheric
transport for the (a) block of the British NPPs (BBP), (b) Kola NPP (KNP), (c) Ringhals NPP
(RNP), and (d) Novaya Zemlya test site (NZS).
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